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ABSTRACT
Irrgators overdraw many Western streams to the detriment of tribal
and environmental uses; these conflicting interestsregularlybattle in state
and federal court over water allocation. This article profiles United States
v. Bell (Bell)'-the latest such skirmish among warring parties in the
Truckee and Carson River basins of northern Nevada. In Bell, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit faced persistent excessive irrigation diversions by the Truckee Carson Irrigation District
(TCID) in violation of applicable federal court decrees, administrative
OperatingCriteriaand Procedures (OCAPs), and the CongressionalSetdement Act of 1990. The Court discussed an unprecedented remedy"water interest"-in order to fully compensate the Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe of the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation for injuries caused by
TCID's unlawful diversions. The United States District Court for the
District of Nevada had awarded water interest, and rather than dismiss
the novel remedy out of hand, the Ninth Circuit remanded the issue to
the DistrictCourt to explain the basis in law or equity for awarding water
interest. This article provides a synopsis of the decades of litigationgiving rise to Bell, an analysis of the decision itself and an evaluation of the
authority supporting the District Court's unusual award of postjudgment
water interest. The article concludes that, taken together, common principles controlling an award of interest, the statutory water recoupment
scheme, and United States Supreme Courtprecedent authorize this novel

remedy. Moreover, such reliefis necessary to fully compensate for the
opportunity cost of lost water and in light of TCID's dogged opposition
to federal law, to dissuade TCID from further procrastinatingin its water
repayment obhgation.

INTRODUCTION
"Procrastination is the thief of time;
Year after year it steals, till all are fled ...
Since 1973 federal courts have struggled to rein in the Truckee Carson Irrigation District (TCID) from delivering water to its irrigators in
1. United States v. Bell, 602 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2010).
2. EDWARD YOUNG, THE COMPLAINT: OR, NIGHT THOUGHTS 22 (Brookfield, E. Merriman
& Co. 1853).

Issue 1I

POSTJUDGMENT "WATER INTEREST"

137

excess of federal law.3 More than twenty years ago, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) reported that between 1973 and 1985, TCID
unlawfully diverted "many hundreds of thousands of acre feet of water"
from the Truckee River in violation of the Secretary of the Interior's
(Secretary) Operating Criteria and Procedures (OCAPs), all the while
challenging the Secretary's authority to promulgate such regulations.'
Congress ultimately entered the fray, passing the Fallon Paiute Shoshone
Indian Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act (Settlement Act) in 1990.'
The Settlement Act validated the OCAPs at issue' and incorporated a
water recoupment remedy first implemented a year prior by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe of Indians v. Hodel (Stampede Credit Case).' Specifically, section
209(j)(3) of the Settlement Act authorizes the Secretary to pursue recoupment of water diverted in excess of OCAPs via settlement or judicial
proceeding, granted that the agreement or order is consistent with the
Endangered Species Act (ESA).' After December 31, 1997 any party with
standing may also pursue recoupment, but "the only reliefavailable from
any court of the United States will be the issuance of a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief directing any unlawful user of water to restore
the amount of water unlawfully diverted."'
3. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton (Tribe v. Morton), 354 F. Supp.
252, 257-58 (D.D.C. 1973) (chronicling the Secretary of the Department of Interior's
(Secretary) acquiescence to TCID's excessive diversions-"water is taken practically on
demand without necessary safeguards to prevent improper and wasteful use"-and flagrant disregard for regulations-TCID formally declared "that it will disregard the new
regulation and will divert water as it chooses by giving instructions to its own water masters"); see also Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist. v. Sec'y of Dep't of Interior (TCID v.
Secretar), 742 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1984) (describing how in 1973, the first year in
which the Secretary's new regulations were in effect, "TCID intentionally violated [the
OCAPsI by diverting more water than the regulations permitted").
4. S. REP. No. 101-555, at 15-16 (1990) (citing Letter from Richard B. Stewart,
Assistant Attorney Gen., Land and Natural Res. Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Martin
AlIday, Solicitor, U.S. Dep't of the Interior (1989)).
5. Fallon Paiute Shoshone Indian Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990
(Settlement Act), Pub. L. No. 101-618, §§ 101-107, 201-210, 104 Stat. 3289 (1990).
6. Id. § 2096)(2) (declaring the 1988 OCAPs shall remain in effect at least through
1997).
7. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Hodel (Stampede Credit Case), 882
F.2d 364, 366 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Settlement Act S 2090)(3) (directing the Secretary
to ensure compliance with all OCAPs and authorizing recoupment of water diverted in
excess of any OCAP).
8. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2007); Settlement
Act § 2096)(3); see also Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark (Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark), 741 F.2d 257, 261-62 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming the district
court's order dedicating the water of the Little Truckee River, from the Stampede Dam
and Reservoir, for the conservation of the cui-ui (Chasmistes cujus) and Lahontan cutthroat trout (Oncorhnchus clarki henshaw) under the ESA rather than dedicating the
water for municipal and industrial use in Reno and Sparks, Nevada under the Washoe
Project Act (Act of Aug. 1, 1956, ch. 809, § 1, 70 Stat. 775, revoked byPub. L. No. 101618, S 205(c), 104 Stat. 3308 (1990))).
9. Settlement Act § 2090)(3) (emphasis added).
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In 1995 the United States brought suit against TCID to recoup over
one million acre-feet of diversions in excess of relevant OCAPs.. In
2003 the United States District Court for the District of Nevada determined that TCID willfully violated the OCAPs and awarded 200,000
acre-feet of water to the United States." Yet-of central interest to this
article-the district court also ordered TCID to "pay" the United States
postjudgment "water interest" at the rate of two percent per year on the
outstanding balance of water owed to the government." On appeal the
Ninth Circuit affirmed a portion of the district court's order, concluding
that the Settlement Act authorized the suit and allowed for a recoupment
award." Yet, in light of the district court's failure to explain the basis for
its award of "water interest" in law or equity, the Ninth Circuit remanded
the issue to the district court to explain its rationale. Specifically, the
Ninth Circuit held that water interest is appropriate only if there is "some
factual basis for awarding more water than was originally taken so as to
provide complete relief.""
Regarding potential sources of authority for an award of postjudgment
water interest, in the absence of common law precedent, applicable statutory provisions may authorize such an award. Yet, the applicable provision in Bell, 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), only speaks to "money judgments].""
Thus, the district court likely relied on the United States' and Tribe's
briefs that directed the court's attention to the United States Supreme
Court's specific reference to postjudgment water interest in footnote eight
of Texas v. New Mexico (Texas v. New Mexico Ill." Yet, the Supreme
Court concluded it was "unpersuaded, however, that 'water interest,' rather than money, should be awarded unless and until it proves to be necessary."" In Bell, such an award of postjudgment water interest may indeed be necessary to stave off any procrastination on the part of TCID in
repaying its 200,000 plus acre-feet water debt. It was this risk of procrastination-and attendant opportunity cost of lost water-that spurred Special Master Meyers to suggest such a remedy in his 1986 Report to the
Court in Texas v. New Mexico III"
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Bell, 602 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1079.
Id. at 1082.
Id. at 1080.
Id. at 1083.
28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (2006) ("Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in

a civil case recovered in a district court .

. .

. Such interest shall be calculated from the

date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant
maturity Treasury yield . . . .").
16. See Bell, 602 F.3d at 1083.
17. Texas v. New Mexico (Texas v. New Mexico II), 482 U.S. 124, 132 n.8 (1987)
(explaining that failure on the part of New Mexico to deliver water pursuant to the
court's order "would entitle Texas to apply to this Court for enforcement . . . and to
some form of postjudgment interest for the period during which that judgment is not
satisfied").
18. Report of the Special Master at 32, Texas v.New Mexico III, 482 U.S. 124
(1987) (No. 65, Orig.) (copy on file with author).
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This article chronicles litigation leading up to Bell, analyzes the decision itself, and evaluates authority supporting the district court's award of
postjudgment water interest. The article concludes that the background
principles controlling an award of interest, the statutory recoupment
scheme itself, and Supreme Court precedent in the interstate compact
context authorize the novel remedy. Further, such relief is necessary to
compensate for the deprivation of the opportunity to put water to beneficial use and, in light of certain time-sensitive Tribal interests, to dissuade
TCID from procrastinating in its water repayment obligation.
I. TIMELINE: A CHRONOLOGY OF CONFLICT
In 1844 Captain John Fremont made the first reported, non-Indian,
sighting of Pyramid Lake." Fifteen years later the United States Department of the Interior (DOI) established a reservation, encompassing the
lake, the lower Truckee River, and surrounding lands, for the Pyramid
President Ulysses S. Grant confirmed the
Lake Paiute tribe (Tribe).
reservation's establishment in an 1874 executive order."
At the turn of the century Congress passed the National Reclamation
Act of 1902,' which authorized the Secretary to withdraw approximately
200,000 acres of land in western Nevada for the Newlands Reclamation
Project (Project).' The Project incorporates water from both the Truckee and Carson Rivers to irrigate the project area near Fallon, Nevada."
Unintentionally, the Newlands Project authorization set the irrigators and
the Tribe on a collision course because the Truckee River is the primary
source of Pyramid Lake water and habitat for the cui-ui and Lahontan
cutthroat trout. " Any diversion of Truckee River water into the Truckee
Canal at Derby Dam (see Figure 1, below) reduces that amount available
for Pyramid Lake, its fishery, and the Reservation.'

19. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 114 (1983).
20. Id. at 115.
21. Id.
22. National Reclamation Act of 1902 (Reclamation Act), ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388
(codified at 43 U.S.C. SS 371-431 (2007). The Reclamation Act, also known as the
Newlands Act of 1902 for Representative (later Senator) Francis G. Newlands of Nevada
who spear-headed the legislative effort, created a "massive program to construct and
operate dams, reservoirs, and canals" to reclaim arid land for settlement. California v.
United States, 438 U.S. 645, 650 (1978). Only a few weeks after the Act's passage, Secretary of the Interior Ethan Allen Hitchcock established the Reclamation Service (what
would later become the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation)) under the United States
INST. FOR Gov'T RESEARCH, THE U.S. RECLAMATION
Geological Survey (USGS).
SERVICE: ITS HISTORY, ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATION 23 (1918). The Newlands

Project was likely the first reclamation project, even predating the formation of the Reclamation Service. Reed D. Benson, Whose Water is it? Private Rights and Public Authority Over Reclamation Project Water, 16 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 363, 424 & n.367 (1997).
23. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. at 115.
24. Id. Fallon is located approximately sixty miles east of Reno, NV.
25. See id. at 119.
26. See id. at 115-16, 119.
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Figure 1. Map of IrigationDistrief
Eleven years later the United States filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of Nevada asserting a claim to the
Truckee River for ten thousand cubic feet of water per second (cfs) for
the Project and 500 cfs for the Reservation." This claim on the Truckee
River water initiated the OrrDitch litigation." The United States grounded its claim to water for the Reservation on the "implied-reservation-ofwater" doctrine established in Witers v. United States." At the conclusion of hearings in 1924 a Special Master issued a report and proposed
decree awarding the Reservation a right to 58.7 cfs from the Truckee
River to irrigate 3,130 acres, with a priority date of 1859, the year the
Reservation was established." The proposed decree also awarded the
Project a right to 1,500 cfs to irrigate 232,800 acres within the Project
area, with a priority date of 1902, the year the Reclamation Act was enacted.
The district court subsequently confirmed the water rights as
27.

Map

of Irrigation District, TRUCKEE-CARSON

IRRIGATION

DISTRICT,

http://www.tcid.org/map.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2011).
28.
Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. at 116.

29.

Id

30. Id.; see Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1908) (holding that
when the United States withdraws land from the public domain to establish an Indian
reservation, it also reserves an amount of water sufficient to meet the present and future
irrigation needs of the Indians; the implied federal reserved water right vests on and
carries a priority date as of the date the reservation was established).
31.
Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. at 117.

32.

Id.
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proposed and entered a temporary restraining order (TRO) which allowed for an experimental period in which the parties to the Orr Ditch
litigation might modify the proposed decreed diversion amounts by
agreement, if necessary."
In 1926 the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District (TCID) began operating the Newlands Project pursuant to a contract with the DOI." The contract authorized DOI to terminate TCID's operation of the Newlands
Project in the event of a breach or a violation of the regulations adopted
to implement the contract." It did not take long for conflicts to develop
over the use of Truckee River water. By the mid-1930s, a severe drought
spurred the parties to settle the OrrDitch litigation and dissolve the 1926
TRO."' In these negotiations TCID, rather than the federal government,
represented the interests of the Newlands Project."
The United States, now only representing the interests of the Reservation, sought additional water rights for irrigating 2,745 more acres of
Reservation land." The parties ultimately accepted DOI's demand for
increased water and signed what later became known as the Truckee River Agreement on July 1, 1935." The Nevada district court then ended the
Orr Ditch litigation in 1944 when it issued a final decree that specifically
incorporated the Truckee River Agreement in its holding." This "Orr
Ditch Decree" affirmed the Tribe's two senior water rights"-Claim
Numbers 1 and 2-with a priority date of 1859" to irrigate 5,875 acres,'
and TCID's junior right-Claim Number 3-with a priority date of 1902
to irrigate 232,800 acres."

Id. The proposed amounts were not modified.
Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. at 118; see also Our History, TRUCKEECARSON IRRIGATION DISTRICT, http://www.tcid.org/historyl.htm (last visited Oct. 1,
2011) ("ITCIDI is a political subdivision of the State of Nevada, organized and chartered
in 1918 for the purpose of representing the water right holders within the boundaries of
the Newlands Project in connection with the operation of the Project.").
TCID v. Secretary, 742 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1984).
35.
36. Id. at 529.
37. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. at 118.
38. Id.
39.
TCID v. Secretary, 742 F.2d at 529.
40. Id. (referencing United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co. (Orr Ditch Decree), In
Equity No. A3, Case No. 73-cv-00003 (D. Nev. 1944) and United States v. Truckee
River Gen. Elec. Co., No. 14861 (N.D. Cal. 1915) now designated Case No. 68-cv-643
(E.D. Cal.)).
41. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. at 121 n.8.
42. United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., 600 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 2010).
43. United States v. Nevada, 412 U.S. 534, 537 (1973).
44. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. at 117 n.3 (noting that no more than approximately 65,000 acres of Newlands Project land was actually irrigated); Truckee River
Chronology A ChronologicalHistory of Lake Tahoe and the Truckee River and Related Water Issues, Div. OF WATER RES., DEP'T OF CONSERVATION & NATURAL RES.,
STATE OF NEV., http://water.nv.gov/mapping/chronologies/truckee/part3.cfm (last visited
Oct. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Chronology] (explaining that the Orr Ditch Decree entitles
TCID to divert 1,500 cfs at Derby Dam).
33.
34.
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The final OrT Ditch Decree, however, did not put an end to allocation problems. In the mid-to-late 1960s, diversions from the Truckee
River led to the listing of fish native to Pyramid Lake as endangered under the ESA* due to reduced water depth, greater erosion, and increased
salinity levels.' Between 1910 and 1966, irrigation diversions from the
Truckee River at Derby Dam in to the Truckee Canal averaged 331 cfs
(240,000 acre-feet per year)." After the United States Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) eliminated diversions solely for hydroelectric power generation, average diversions at Derby Dam from 1967 to 1994
dropped to 253 cfs (183,160 acre-feet per year)."
Based on the recommendations of a 1964 taskforce, the Secretary
promulgated regulations in 1967 that established OCAPs limiting the
amount of water available, within decreed rights, to TCID to divert from
the Truckee River in order to increase that amount available to Pyramid
Lake.' In 1970 the Tribe brought suit against the Secretary for failing to
meet his trust responsibilities by illegally and unnecessarily authorizing
TCID to divert Truckee water in exceedance of the 1967 OCAPs.' The
District Court for the District of Columbia held that the 1967 OCAPs
were arbitrary considering that the Secretary disregarded the Orr Ditch
and Alpine Decrees, and the Secretary failed to prevent unnecessary
waste within the irrigation district."
In 1973 the court approved revised OCAPs" designed to effectively
measure water use, minimize waste, restrict application of water to land
pursuant to the Orr Ditch and Alpine Decrees, and ensure TCID's compliance with the revised orders." To meet the court's directives, the
amended regulations maximized storage of upper Truckee River water in
Stampede Reservoir for the benefit of the Tribe, required that TCID
deliver at least 385,000 acre-feet of water to Pyramid Lake to preserve its
current depth, and capped the amount of Truckee River water that TCID
could divert into the Truckee Canal." Additionally, the court affirmed
45. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2007).
46. Stampede Credit Case, 882 F.2d 364, 366 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 255 (D.D.C. 1973)).
47. Chronology, supra note 44.
48. Id.
49. 43 C.F.R. § 418.16-.27 (2011); Stampede Credit Case, 882 F.2d at 366.
50. Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. at 255.
51. Id. at 256-57 (holding also that the Secretary was obliged to promulgate even
more restrictive OCAPs to insure "that all water not obligated by court decree or contract with the District goes to Pyramid Lake").
52. Id. at 260-65 (amending judgment and order including Section A, Truckee Diversion Criteria and Section B, Storage Credit at Stampede).
53. Id. at 258.
54. Stampede Credit Case, 882 F.2d at 366; TCID v. Secretary, 742 F.2d 527, 530
(9th Cir. 1984) (capping the amount to 350,000 acre-feet in 1973 and to 288,129 acrefeet each year thereafter); Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. at 255. Truckee River water
may be stored either upstream in Stampede Reservoir or diverted at the Derby Dam,
through the Truckee Canal, to Lahontan Reservoir. Whereas water stored in Stampede
Reservoir may be released to Pyramid Lake for the benefit of the Tribe, water, once
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the paramount nature of the Secretary's trust responsibility to the Tribe,
holding that existing contracts between DOI and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), and Reclamation and the United States
Forest Service,"[could not] be interposed as . . . obstacle[si to the Lake
receiving the maximum benefit from the upper Truckee flow into Stampede."' In practice, the amended regulatory scheme requires that the
Secretary direct any water not obligated by decree or contract to flow to
Pyramid Lake."
Similar to the 1926 contract, the amended regulations also authorized
the Secretary to terminate TCID's contract if the irrigation district engaged in a substantial violation of the regulations." Later in 1973 TCID
intentionally violated the permitted diversion amounts, thus forcing the
Secretary to terminate the 1926 contract." On behalf of the Reservation,
the United States quickly brought suit to secure additional instream (nonconsumptive use) water rights to the Truckee River, beyond those consumptive use. rights previously litigated in Orr Ditch." The United States
asserted, again relying on the Winters doctrine, that the executive order
establishing the Reservation had also reserved the amount necessary to
maintain the Pyramid Lake fishery, including the lower Truckee River
spawning grounds.'
The Nevada district court dismissed the government's claim, holding
that it was "the same quiet title cause of action asserted by the plaintiff in
OrrDitch .... The plaintiff and the Tribe may not litigate several different types of water use claims, all arising under the Winters doctrine and
all derived from the same water source in a piece-meal fashion."' In
United States v. TCID, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed that part of the decision concluding that res judicata prevents re-litigating the claim at issue in Orr Ditch but held that Orr Ditch
did not conclude the dispute between the Tribe and the owners of Newlands Project lands." The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and ultimately affirmed that part of the Ninth Circuit's decision concerning res judicata of the Orr Ditch cause of action but also reversed
that portion regarding the viability of the claim between TCID and the

diverted to Lahontan Reservoir, cannot be returned upstream to the Tribe. Stampede
Credit Case, 882 F.2d at 366.
Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. at 258, 260-61; see also supra Figure 1 (illustrat55.
ing how Stampede Reservoir holds upper Truckee River water that may later be released
back into the river for eventual delivery to Pyramid Lake).
Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. at 256.
56.
57. TCID v. Secretary,742 F.2d at 530.
58. Id. (describing TCID's subsequent suit to prevent the Secretary from terminating
the contract and the district's attack on the validity of the 1973 OCAP; in 1973 the court
upheld the Secretary's decision to terminate the contract).
59. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 118 (1983).
60. Id. at 19.
61. Id. at 120.
62. Id. at 120-21.
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United States and Tribe.' The Supreme Court held that the United
States was barred from "asserting the same reserved right for purposes of
'fishing' and maintenance of 'lands and waters' that was asserted in Orr
Ditch.""
While parties litigated rights to Truckee River water, litigation over
Carson River water similarly raged. An interim restraining order signed
in 1952 triaged contested claims to the Carson River until the Nevada

district court decided United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co. (Alpine Land & Reservoir )' in 1980." The Nevada district court's final
order, the "Alpine Decree,"' settled water rights to the Carson River and
was subsequently modified and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit."' In 1988
the Secretary established the current OCAP "based on actual project water-righted and irrigated acreage," and in 1992 assigned a water duty of
3.5 acre-feet per year for Newlands Project bottomlands and 4.5 acre-feet
per year for bench lands."' The regulation had the effect of limiting water
delivered by restricting application of water to only that land classified as
"eligible" by Reclamation, in accord with the annual water duty."
By 1990 Congress noticed TCID's deliberate diversion of water in
excess of the 1973 OCAPs (and the Secretary's subsequent termination
of TCID's contract), waste of Newlands Project water, delivery of Project
water to lands without valid water rights, and wrongful diversions potentially exceeding 800,000 acre-feet of water." Partly in response to these
transgressions, Congress enacted the Fallon Paiute Shoshone Indian
Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990 (Settlement Act)" authorizing
the Secretary to enforce compliance with all OCAPs and "pursue recoupment of any water diverted from the Truckee River in excess of the
amounts permitted by any such [OCAPI."" Congress also specified that

63. Id. at 121.
64. Id. at 134.
65. 503 F. Supp. 877 (D. Nev. 1980).
66. TCID v. Secretary, 742 F.2d 527, 531 n.2 (9th Cir. 1984); see supra Figure 1
(depicting how the Lahontan Reservoir stores both Carson River water and that Truckee
River water diverted at Derby Dam (routed through the Truckee Canal); the system then
employs 600 miles of main water ditches and 1,500 delivery points to distribute the
water for irrigation purposes); see also Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 255 (D.D.C.
1973).
67. Bell, 602 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2010).
68. United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co. (Alpine Land & Reservoir I), 697
F.2d 851, 860 (9th Cir. 1983).
69. Chronology, supra note 44.
70. 43 C.F.R. § 418.1, .8, .10-.11 (2010) ("The valid water deliveries at the headgate
are set by the product of eligible land actually irrigated multiplied by the appropriate
water duty . .

).

71. S. REP. 101-555, at 14 (1990).
72. Fallon Paiute Shoshone Indian Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990
(Settlement Act), Pub. L. No. 101-618, §§ 101-107, 201-210, 104 Stat. 3289 (1990).
73. Id. § 209(j)(3).
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the Settlement Act not be interpreted in such a way as to conflict with the

OrrDitch and Alpine Decrees.'
TCID's absence from the Settlement Act negotiations was cause for
concern and noted by several parties. Former Nevada Representative
Vucanovich expressed, "[wihether [TCID] walked away from the negotiations or was barred from real participation . . . matters very little at this
point. We simply cannot expect to legislatively end the years of litigation
. .. without involving such a major player in the deal."" In contrast, Nevada Senator Reid explained that the Tribe's and TCID's declaration to
continue litigating relevant OCAPs, rather than settle their differences
within the Act, did not indicate the legislatiofi was fatally flawed." When
questioned by Senator Bradley, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Water and Power, Senator Reid stated "it wouldn't be right to have one party
be able to veto the agreement" after the thousands of hours the cities,
states, and tribes have put into it."
Perhaps not surprisingly, TCID continued to violate the applicable
agreements and regulations, even though they were ratified in the 1990
Settlement Act. As a result, the United States began the litigation that
produced the Ninth Circuit decision that is the subject of this article.

II. UNITED STATES V BELL, 602 F.3D 1074 (9TH CIR. 2010)
In 1995 the United States brought suit against TCID to recoup over
one million acre-feet of diversions in excess of OCAPs in force from
1973 to 1988." Fifteen years later the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the validity of the 1973 OCAPs and upheld
the district court's conclusion that the Fallon Paiute Shoshone Indian
Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990 (Settlement Act)" authorized
the suit." The court further determined that the Settlement Act allowed
for water recoupment awards, upheld much of the district court's recoupment order, and held that the order was compatible with the Orr

74. Id. § 210(b)(13).
75. Truckee-Carson-PyiamidLake Water Rights Settlement Act HearingBefore the
Subconnn. on Water and Power, 101st Cong. 97 (1990) (statement of Rep. Barbara
Vucanovich).
76. Id. at 45 (statement of Sen. Harry M. Reid).
77. Id. at 105.
78. Bell, 602 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010). In total, six cases were brought by the
United States in the District Court for the District of Nevada, Judge Howard D. McKibben, Presiding; the Ninth Circuit designated the appeals Nos. 05-16154, 05-16157, 0516158, 05-16187, 05-16189 and 05-16909, and issued one opinion as to all the appeals.
The United States brought the suit against TCID and all agricultural users of water supplied by TCID, including Arthur W. Bell, IV, the lead defendant in all six cases; the
State of Nevada was also a named defendant as a water user. Id. at 1074-75, 1079 (noting lengthy evidentiary proceedings postponed the district court's decision until 2003).
79. Fallon Paiute Shoshone Indian Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990
(Settlement Act), Pub. L. No. 101-618, § 209(i), 104 Stat. 3289 (1990).
80. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1081.
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Ditcf and Alpine" Decrees.' However, the Ninth Circuit vacated the
award concerning pre and postjudgment interest and remanded with instructions for the district court to explain its basis." The Ninth Circuit
also vacated and remanded the issues of the methodology for calculating
excess diversion amounts, and the calculation of the amount spilled from
Lahontan Reservoir in light of gauge error.'
In 1926 TCID had entered into a contract with the Secretary to assume operational control of the Newlands Project.' Court orders in 1944
and 1980 established the maximum diversion amounts for the Truckee
and Carson Rivers, respectively." However, by the mid-1960s irrigation
diversions from the Truckee had adversely affected the river's ability to
recharge Pyramid Lake, thereby jeopardizing the Pyramid Lake fishery.'
In response, the Secretary established OCAPs in 1967, later challenged
in Tribe i Morton." The 1967 OCAPs were succeeded by more restrictive court-ordered OCAPs in 1973." In 1995 the United States brought
suit against TCID under the Settlement Act seeking recoupment of over
one million acre-feet of water diverted in excess of OCAPs from 1973 to
1988." Although the Nevada district court determined that TCID willfully violated the OCAPs, it awarded just 200,000 acre-feet of water to the
United States, holding TCID liable for excesses in 1974, 1975, 1978, and
1979 and for spills in 1979 and 1980." The district court ordered TCID
to "pay" the United States with water, including postjudgment "water in-

81. United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co. (OrrDitch), In Equity No. A3, Case No.
73-cv-00003 (D. Nev. 1944); United States v. Truckee River Gen. Elec. Co., No. 14861
(N.D. Cal. 1915) now designated Case No. 68-cv-643 (E.D. Cal.).
82. Alpine Land & Reservoir 1, 503 F. Supp. 877 (D. Nev. 1980).
83. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1082, 1085
84. Id. at 1083-84.
85. Id. at 1085 (referencing spills of Truckee River water in the amount of 11,938 af
and 12,193 af in 1979 and 1980, respectively, and the district court's erroneous accounting of the statistical uncertainty associated with the government's published flow data).
TCID regulates its diversions of Truckee River water at Derby Dam based on end-ofmonth storage targets at Lahontan Reservoir, but the mathematical uncertainty in such
forecasts will at times contribute to an excess of water at the reservoir, thus leading to
spills or precautionary drawdowns. JEREMY PRATT, TRUCKEE-CARSON RIVER BASIN
STUDY:

FINAL

REPORT

TO

THE

WESTERN

WATER

POLICY

REVIEW

ADVISORY

COMMIssION 96 (Clear Water Consulting Corp. ed., 1997). Though a system of drains
collects some of the water spilled at Lahontan Reservoir and transports it to Stillwater
Marsh and Carson Lake and Pasture wetlands, a significant portion escapes to the Carson Sink, "failing to serve any of the priority uses in the lower Carson Basin." Id. at 22,
96; see also supra Figure 1 (delineating the Carson Division from the Truckee Division).
86. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 118 (1983).
87. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1078.
88. Id.
89. 354 F. Supp. at 255-56.
90. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1078.
91. Id. at 1079.
92. Id.
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terest."' However, the court denied the government's request for prejudgment interest."
On appeal TCID challenged the validity of the 1973 OCAP but the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court on this point, concluding that the
Settlement Act expressly validated the OCAPs." TCID also challenged
whether the Settlement Act authorizes the United States to litigate for
past diversions in excess of OCAPs." Again, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the lower court and held that the Act unambiguously provides for litigation if settlement fails and authorizes the Secretary to enforce compliance
with all OCAPs, past, present, and future." The court also held that
awarding recoupment water under the Act did not constitute contempt"
and that previous government assurances that the 1973 OCAP would not
be enforced did not constitute "affirmative misconduct" causing "serious
injustice" such that estoppel barred the government's suit."
TCID and Nevada next claimed that simultaneous compliance with
the decrees and the Settlement Act (intended to restore Pyramid Lake)
was impossible given the limited water supply.'"' The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument, reasoning that although a specific amount is decreed, TCID is not always entitled to divert the full amount since the
district's right is dependent on the application of beneficial use without
waste or uneconomic application.o' Moreover, "TCID's past record of
noncompliance" put the burden on TCID to satisfy both the decrees and
recoupment order, possibly through implementation of conservation
measures resulting in "credit water" available to satisfy the order."'
After upholding the district court's determination that TCID was liable under the Settlement Act for violating applicable OCAPs, the Ninth
Circuit next considered the propriety of awarding pre and postjudgment
water interest. Reasoning by analogy to the law on awarding money interest, the court stated that in the absence of common law precedent an
award of postjudgment "water interest" must be authorized by statute."
Since the statute at issue only allows for interest "on any money judgment
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1081.
96. Id. at 1079.
97. See id. at 1080.
98. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir.1999)
(noting that a party is in contempt only when it first violates a judicial order).
99. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1082 (citing Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 707 (9th Cir.
1989)).
100. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1080.
101. Alpine Land & Reservoir II, 697 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1983). See also Bell,
602 F.3d at 1081 (relying on the Ninth Circuit's definition of beneficial use which is
premised on application of that amount of water necessary to irrigate the maximum
amount of crops suitable for a given tract of land).
102. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1081.
103. Id. at 1083. See also Pierce v. United States, 255 U.S. 398, 406 (1921) (holding
that "lalt common lawl,l judgments do not bear interest; interest rests solely upon statutory provision").
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in a civil case," it did not provide the necessary authority." After dismissing the government's argument that prior United States Supreme Court
precedent" allows for "water interest," the court determined that any authority for such interest was likely based in equity. The Ninth Circuit
then remanded the case for the district court to determine if the award
was necessary to compensate the plaintiffs and to explain why the lower
court had chosen a postjudgment interest rate of two percent per year on
the outstanding balance of water owed to the government. The court also
criticized the district court's denial of prejudgment interest. In contrast
to postjudgment interest, in the absence of statutory authorization, common law provides for prejudgment interest.'" The Ninth Circuit also disagreed with the lower court that the government's delay in bringing its suit
warranted a denial of prejudgment interest since the government's cause
of action did not become available until 1990, upon enactment of the
Settlement Act.
The Ninth Circuit next assessed the district court's calculation of the
recoupment award. Declining to second-guess the lower court, the Ninth
Circuit observed that estimates of excess diversions of Carson River water
and spills of Truckee River water matched those of TCID's own expert.
However, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in subtracting the level of statistical uncertainty from the published flow data,
which limited the amount of water available for recoupment."' The court
remanded the issue for the district court to recalculate the amount diverted based on the government's published flow data.
Regarding contested diversions from 1981 to 1984, the Ninth Circuit
upheld the district court's denial of recoupment and concluded that the
Secretary's failure to amend the 1973 OCAPs, in light of increased diversions made available by the 1980 Alpine Decree, prevented the government from showing that TCID diverted in excess of a relevant standard
during those years. However, the court agreed with the government that
failure to amend the 1973 OCAP did not excuse TCID's spills at Lahontan Reservoir, in contravention of the principle of beneficial use, between

1981 and 1984.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's decision not to
dismiss the farmers, even though they bore no individual liability for
TCID's diversions, because the long history of litigation in the basin sug-

104. 28 U.S.C. S 1961(a) (2006).
Texas v. New Mexico III, 482 U.S. 124, 133 n.8 (1987) (explaining that "water
105.
interest" should not "be awarded unless and until it proves to be necessary").
106. City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., Nat'l Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189, 194 (1995)
(reasoning that in the absence of a legislative determination regarding prejudgment interest, "the absence of a statute merely indicates that the question is governed by traditional
judge-made principles").
107. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1085 ("IThe district court accounted for statistical uncertainty
in the flow data by subtracting the confidence interval from the published quantities,
effectively assigning all of the uncertainty against the Tribe.").
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gested it prudent to bar subsequent collateral attack." The Ninth Circuit
also denied the farmers' attorney fees as prevailing parties under the
Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA)." The court concluded that the
farmers were not prevailing parties because the district court's decision
was wholly in favor of the United States and the Tribe."o Although the
district court did not impose individual liability on the farmers, it found
that TCID unlawfully diverted nearly 200,000 acre-feet for the farmers'
benefit."'
On November 29, 2010, the Supreme Court denied TCID's petition
for writ of certiorari after the United States Solicitor General refrained
from replying to TCID's petition."' On remand to the district court, approximately 150,000 acre-feet of water is in play through recalculations
due to gauge error, measurement of that amount spilled, and determination of the validity of awarding postjudgment water interest."' Part IV
next explores sources of authority for postjudgment water interest. It
concludes that in an action to recoup water under federal law, Supreme
Court precedent authorizes a federal court to borrow postjudgment interest concepts from the monetary damages context to fully compensate the
claimant-especially when the interest might dissuade the respondent
from procrastinating in the repayment of water.

III. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE: UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT PRECEDENT CONTEMPLATES A COMPLEMENTARY
AWARD OF WATER INTEREST TO FULLY COMPENSATE THE
TRIBE AND HEAD OFF ANY DELAY IN REPAYMENT
A federal court sitting in equity must make the injured party whole
and, in light of United States Supreme Court precedent in the interstate
compact context, may borrow the practice of awarding interest on damag-

108. See Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Peabody W. Coal Co., 400 F.3d 774,
780 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[Wie have elsewhere found that tribes are necessary parties to
actions that might have the result of directly undermining authority they would otherwise
exercise.").
109. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1086-87; See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2011).
110. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1087 (reasoning that a plaintiff must be "awarded some relief by
the court" on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail) (citing Poland v.
Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1186-87 (9th Cir. 2007)).
111. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1087.
112. Order List: 562 U.S., SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 6 (Nov. 29,
2010), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/112910zor.pdf; see also Bd. of
Dirs. of Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 653, 653 (2010).
113. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1085, 1087 (vacating those amounts the district court found
TCID improperly diverted from 1974 to 1979 (173, 021 acre-feet) and spilled from 1979
to 1980 (24,131 acre-feet), and remanding to recalculate upward in light of gauge error;
vacating and remanding judgment to quantify amounts spilled from 1981 to 1984; and
vacating and remanding post and prejudgment interest calculations in consideration of
same).
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es to fully compensate a claimant for injury due to unlawful diversions."'
In evaluating authority for equitable remedies available to a federal court
in an action to recoup water under the Settlement Act, similar actions
under common law principles, statutory recoupment schemes, and interstate compacts demonstrate the viability of water interest relief. In light
of the scope of injury to the Tribe's agricultural, ecological, and cultural
interests, background principles giving rise to an award of interest on
monetary damages to fully compensate a claimant are particularly relevant
Additionally, water interest complements relief provided by the
water recoupment scheme codified in the Settlement Act. Finally, the
Supreme Court's discussion of interest on outstanding water balances in
the interstate compact context provides the strongest authority for a water
interest award."'
Specifically, Special Master Meyers's practical
posjudgment water interest remedy, as announced in Texas v. New Mexicco III, is necessary to fully compensate the Tribe and stave off any procrastination on the part of TCID in meeting its repayment obligation."'
A. COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES GIVING RISE TO AN AWARD OF
INTEREST IN THE MONETARY DAMAGES CONTEXT ARE PARTICULARLY
INSTRUCTIVE IN THE WATER RECOUPMENT SETTING.

1. Traditional Common Law Causes of Action Lacked Water Recoupment Mechanisms.
Prior to the enactment of state and federal statutory schemes controlling the acquisition and adjudication of water rights, courts insisted that a
claimant satisfy certain predicate elements in actions for damages due to
interference with a vested water right. Unlike property rights in real
property, rights in water "are usufructuary; ownership of the resource
itself remains in the public."" Thus, interference with an appropriator's
right to the continuous flow of water for beneficial use under state law
premised a cause of action. "' Specifically, the measure of actionable
interference corresponded to the repercussions attributable to the inability to apply water to a particular beneficial use."' Further, since "missing"
114. See Kansas v. Colorado (Kansas v. Colorado 1), No. 105, Orig., 2000 WL
34508307, at *40-41 (Aug. 31, 2000); see also Texas v. New Mexico III, 482 U.S. 124,
131-32 (1987).
115. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
116. See Report of the Special Master, supra note 18, at 32.
117. Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 55 (Colo.
1999).
118.
HENRY
P. FARNHAM,
THE LAW OF WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL,
NATIONAL,
STATE, MUNICIPAL, AND INDIVIDUAL,
INCLUDING
IRRIGATION, DRAINAGE, AND MUNICIPAL WATER SUPPLY 2123 (1904).

119. Id. at 2124 n.2 (presenting the subsequent destruction of a field and the crops
grown thereon as an example of actionable interference). For example, though a Colorado statute requires that any substituted water be of a "quality and continuity" to meet
an appropriator's normal demands, the substitution of clear water for silty water-a highly desirable trait as silt seals cracks in the beds and banks of irrigation ditches-does not
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water is not yet reduced to possession, a cause of action for the value of
such previously diverted water is not available: water "does not become
his property until it reaches his ditches."" Thus, state and federal legislatures enacted remedial statutes allowing for the recoupment of water unlawfully diverted."' However, despite a legislative predilection for recoupment schemes, no express statutory allowance for pre or postjudgment water interest on recoupment awards yet exists in the federal arena.'"2
2. Common Law Principles Controlling Awards of Pre and Postjudgment
Interest are Particularly Instructive to Water Recoupment and Necessary
to Fully Compensate for Deprivation of the Opportunity to Put Water to
Beneficial Use.
Though express provisions for interest on nonmonetary awards in water recoupment actions are lacking, background principles controlling
interest on monetary awards are analogous and persuasive in the recoupment context because any procrastination in the repayment of water
compounds injury to those beneficial uses deprived of the application of
water. In the monetary damages context, the legal principle that guides
the assessment of interest is qui tardiussolvit, minus solvit-whoever pays
tardily, pays less.'" Considering that a delay in reparations prevents the
claimant from making timely use of compensation, thereby compounding
injury, the respondent is expected to compensate for such delay.'' Grotius expressed the concept of compensation for the lost time value of an
injured asset as early as 1625.'" In essence, the claimant is entitled to
those damages associated with the potential income or products derived
from the injured asset. Though in light of the uncertainty in calculating
hypothetical lost profits, interest is usually awarded on injuries to nonconstitute an unreasonable deterioration in quality giving rise to actionable interference.
COLO. REV. STAT. S 37-80-120(3) (2011); A-B Cattle Co. v. United States, 589 P.2d 57,
59-60 (Colo. 1978) (holding that under a maximum utilization doctrine an appropriator
has no legal right to the continued delivery of silt-laden water after the construction of a
federal dam resulted in delivery of clear water from the impoundment area).
120.
FARNHAM, supra note 118, at 2123-24.
121. See NEv. REV. STAT. § 533.481(l)(b) (2010). For instance, in addition to administrative fines upwards of $10,000, the Nevada State Engineer may require a person who
effects an unlawful diversion of water to "replace not more than 200 percent of the water
[unlawfullyl used, wasted or diverted." Id. S 533.48 1(1)(a), (b) (emphasis added); Fallon
Paiute Shoshone Indian Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990 (Settlement Act),
Pub. L. No. 101-618, S 209(j)(3), 104 Stat. 3289 (1990).
122. Bell, 602 F.3d 1074, 1083 (9th Cir. 2010).
123. Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Below-market Interest in InternationalClaims Against
States, 13 J. INT'L EcON. L. 423, 427 (2010).
124. Id.
125.

HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIs LIBIU TRES [ON THE LAW OF WAR

AND PEACE THREE BOOKs] 431 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Clarendon Press 1925) (1625)
("Moreover, a person will be understood to have less, and therefore to have suffered
loss, not only in the property itself, but also in the products which strictly belong to it,
whether these have actually been gathered or not, if he might have gathered them . . . .").
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income producing assets." While pre and postjudgment interest operate
similarly to lost profits, in accounting for the time value of money that
should have been paid earlier to compensate for injury, only prejudgment
interest is "governed by traditional judge-made principles."" In contrast,
since the common law does not authorize postjudgment interest, "the
propriety of an award of postjudgment interest 'rests solely upon the statutory provision.""
In addition, Ninth Circuit precedent demonstrates that a monetary
judgment is not a precondition to an award of pre or postjudgment interest.'" In its brief, counsel for the Tribe cited the Ninth Circuit's decision
in United States v. Gordon" that affirmed an award of monetary prejudgment interest on a nonmonetaryjudgment involving embezzled securities (a nonmonetary instrument)."' Therefore, although Gordon does
not speak to an award of nonmonetary interest on a nonmonetary judgment, it does suggest that monetary judgments are not a precondition to
postjudgment interest.
Perhaps even more so than in the monetary damages context-where
monetary interest indirecdy compensates through the purchase of goods
or services to ameliorate injury-nonmonetary water interest directly
compensates, as it is precisely the medium through which deprivation of
application of water to beneficial use is ameliorated. At present, the
Tribe is doubly worse off for TCID's unlawful diversions of water in
1974, 1975, 1978, and 1979: beyond the time it will take to compensate
the Tribe for damage to agricultural, ecological, and cultural resources,"
126. Fellmeth, supra note 123, at 427.
127. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1083-84 (citing Dishman v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 269
F.3d 974, 989 (9th Cir. 2001)).
128. Bell, 602 F.3d at 1083. Some commentators are careful to distinguish 'interest
on damages' from 'interest as damages'; when interest constitutes damages itself, it usually refers to actual costs incurred such as monies borrowed to mitigate damage from a
wrongful act. Fellmeth, supra note 123, at 436. As implemented by the Nevada district
court, 'water interest' would constitute 'interest on damages' since it is based on that
recoupment amount which TCID inust repay, rather than a standalone damages award.
Bell, 602 F.3d at 1082-83.
129. See United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044, 1057-59 (9th Cir. 2004).
130. See Opening/Answering Brief for Appellee/Cross-Appellant Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians at 31, Bell, 602 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2010) (Nos. 05-16154, 0516157, 05-16158, 05-16187, 05-16189 and 05-16909).
131.
Gordon, 393 F.3d at 1059-60.
132. Indian Water Policy: Hearing Before the S Select Comm. on Indian Affairs,
101st Cong. 43 (1989) (statement of Hon. Joe Ely, Chairman, Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe). Regarding the scope of injury suffered by the Tribe from excessive diversions by
TCID, the Hon. Joe Ely, Chairman, Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, remarked during hearings leading up to the Settlement Act:
For the sake of simplicity, let's tally up the score of destruction the Newlands Project has
executed. Since 1905, it has completely destroyed the natural Lahontan Cutthroat trout
fishery at Pyramid Lake, which consequently completely destroyed the tribe's economy,
leading to reliance on Federal funds. It has all but led to the extinction of the cui-ui,
which is the identity and major component of the tribe's way of life. It has dried up
totally our sister Lake Winnemucca, which was a thriving wetlands and waterfowl area.
It has caused major destruction of the Stillwater Wildlife Refuge near Fallon, Nevada,
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it is uncertain whether the Tribe might ever recover the attendant opportunity cost (e.g., crop production, fish spawning, and cultural preservation)" associated with being deprived of the ability to apply water to beneficial use during the late 1970s.
What is certain though, is that an award of water interest stands a better chance of redressing injuries to the Pyramid Lake fishery than a monetary award. For example, the 1992 Cui-ui Recovery Plan called for supplemental inflow of 110,000 acre-feet of Truckee River water to the Lake,
partly through reduction of TCID's diversions to Newlands Project irrigators.'
It is questionable whether a monetary award would allow the
Tribe to procure water rights to 110,000 acre-feet of Truckee River water
in light of the newly acquired rights' junior priority dates. Moreover,
without a water interest component, any further delay by TCID in honoring its recoupment obligation will compound injury to certain timesensitive interests, like recovery of the endangered cui-ui and threatened
Lahontan cutthroat trout." Therefore, background principles giving rise
to an award of interest on monetary damages are particularly instructive
to the water recoupment setting since pre and postjudgment interest insure a greater probability that injury to Tribal interests will indeed be
fully compensated in a timely manner.
B. AN AWARD OF WATER INTEREST WOULD COMPLEMENT THE
FIRMLY ESTABLISHED WATER RECOUPMENT SCHEME FIRST
IMPLEMENTED IN THE STAMPEDE CREDIT CASE AND LATER CODIFIED
IN THE SETTLEMENT ACT.
Prior to implementing an explicit water recoupment strategy to enforce relevant OCAPs promulgated by the Secretary, federal courts in
where the project spills its toxic poison into the wetlands after irrigating its fields. And it
is currently destroying the world's largest natural pelican refuge, Anaho Island, by contaminating the pelicans' food supply at the Stillwater Wetlands. Id.
133. Donald B. Seney, The ChangingPoliticalFortunesof the Truckee-Carson IrrigaLion District,76 AGRIc. HIST. 220, 225 (2002). Though the Tribe appropriates Truckee
River water for agricultural purposes, members of the Tribe are not historically farmers
but rather fishers who depend on sufficient flows to allow the cui-ui and Lahontan cutthroat trout to reach their spawning beds. Id. Presently, Tribal members derive most of
their livelihood from the Lahontan cutthroat trout fishery through the sale of permits for
fishing, boating, and camping. Indian Water PolicyHearing,supra note 132, at 40.
134. PRATT, supra note 85, at 26.
135. Pyramid Lake is the sole remaining habitat for the cui-ui, a large sucker that
grows to a length of two feet and lives up to thirty years, and was listed as endangered
under the ESA in 1967; the cui-ui also serves as a seasonal food source for the tribe. Id.
at 24-25. Pyramid Lake is also home to the Lahontan cutthroat trout, whose original
Pyramid Lake strain grew to sixty pounds and lived upwards of ten years, and was listed
as threatened under the ESA in 1975. Id. at 27. Though the original strain went extinct
by 1944, the species was restocked via hatchery operations, but restocked species seldom grow more than fifteen pounds. Id. Unlike the cui-ui, the Lahontan cutthroat have
suffered permanent loss of genetic diversity and require significantly greater flows
throughout the year to reach their natural spawning grounds on the lower Truckee River.
Id.
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this ongoing dispute authorized water masters to condition delivery of
water pursuant to federal court decrees." In practice, depriving misbehaving owners of decreed water rights constitutes an approved means of
enforcing regulatory rules and measures." In 1984 the Ninth Circuit in
TCID v. Secretary held that the Secretary is authorized to reduce the
quantity of water diverted to Newlands Project users below the maximum
amounts permitted by the relevant decree since the "the Secretary explicitly reserved the right to issue regulations governing the operation of the
Newlands Project."" In 1989 the Ninth Circuit in the Stampede Credit
Case approved of a restitutionary remedy to recoup illegally diverted
Truckee River water for the benefit of the Pyramid Lake fishery.'" Although TCID released 21,500 acre-feet of water for irrigation from Stampede Reservoir pursuant to the district court's erroneous interpretation of
applicable OCAPs, the Ninth Circuit held that the resultant injury to the
Pyramid Lake fishery could be remedied by storing an equivalent amount
of water from TCID's future allotment, for later release to the Lake." In
essence, TCID and Newlands Project water users were required to repay
the previously released water to the Tribe pursuant to the Secretary's
plan.'
In 1990 Congress formally adopted such a recoupment scheme when
it enacted the Settlement Act."' To ensure compliance with all OCAPs,
the Settlement Act authorized the Secretary to "pursue recoupment of
any water diverted from the Truckee River in excess of the amounts

136. The Orr Ditch Decree limits that amount of Truckee River water available to
Newlands Project users:
Except as herein specially provided no diversion of water into any ditch or canal,
in this decree mentioned shall be permitted except in such amount as shall actually, reasonably necessary for the economical and beneficial use for which the
right of diversion is determined and established by this decree.
Tribe Opening Brief supra note 130, at 4. The Alpine Decree similarly limits that
amount of Carson River water available:
The quantities of water to be diverted by the owners of the several ditches,
through those ditches, on account of the several priorities herein allowed, are allowed subject to the obligations of said owners to divert and use water only at
such times as needed and only in such amounts as may be required for actual,
reasonable beneficial use.
Id.; see also Alpine Land & Reservoir Co. I (Alpine Decree), 503 F. Supp. 877, 881 (D;
Nev. 1980).
137. See Bell, 602 F.3d 1074, 1083-84 (9th Cir. 2010).
138.. TCID. v. Secretary,742 F.2d 527, 529-30, 532 (9th Cir. 1984).
139. Stampede Credit Case, 882 F.2d 364, 365-67, 370-71 (9th Cir. 1989).
140. Id. at 368.
141. Id.; Tribe OpeningBrief,supra note 130, at 12.
142. See Fallon Paiute Shoshone Tribal Settlement Act (Settlement Act), Pub. L. No.
101-618, §§ 101-107, 201-210, 104 Stat. 3289 (1990).
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permitted by any such [OCAPI."'" Specifically, section 209(j)(3) provides
that in a recoupment suit brought by any party other than the Secretary,
the only relief available is an order directing recovery of the unlawfully
diverted water." Additionally, because the Settlement Act is federal law,
"no court may order relief inconsistent with its express terms."'" Therefore, considering that recovery under the Settlement Act is constrained to
water recoupment, and that interest is a necessary component of relief to
fully compensate the Tribe, water interest is an appropriate means of
relief.
In addition, an award of water interest does not run counter to the
Supreme Court's guidance in City of Milwaukie v. Cement Division, National Gypsum Co., that in the absence of an applicable statutory provision prejudgment interest is governed by common law," since the Settlement Act expressly directs the Secretary to recoup water, not money.
Moreover, the Supreme Court spoke to the flexible nature of interest,
declaring "lit] is not recovered according to a rigid theory of compensation for money withheld, but is given in response to considerations of
fairness[.J"'" Thus, a federal court sitting in equity likely has sufficient
discretion to endorse a means of relief that is congruent with the express
water recoupment scheme provided by the Settlement Act.
Finally, by delivering sorely needed water to the Pyramid Lake fishery, water interest furthers both the remedial purpose of the Settlement
Act and Congress's desire that any recoupment order be consistent with
the ESA." Two of the Settlement Act's remedial purposes are to fulfill
the federal government's trust obligations to the Tribes and to further the

143. Id. § 209(j)(3). Sen. Reid, key sponsor of the legislation, spoke to a "credit waters" concept in hearings leading up to the Act's passage. Truckee-Carson-PyraimidLake
Water Rights Settlement Act- HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Water and Power, 101st
Cong. 44 (1990) (testimony of Sen. Reid) (exclaiming that "if we put some efficiency
back into the river's operation we could improve conditions for the cui-ui" and "this
would be accomplished by making better use of the river's available storage facilities
through the exchange of credit waters . . . ."). Granted, parties to the legislation realized

that the Stampede Credit Case litigation would remain outstanding after passage of the
Settlement Act. Id. at 531 ("List of Cases involving Truckee and Carson Rivers remaining if S. 1554 is passed as introduced on August 4, 1989.").
144. Settlement Act S 209(j)(3).
145. Texas v. New Mexico (Texas v. New Mexico 1), 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983); see
also Texas v. New Mexico II, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1986) (clarifying that when an interstate compact is approved by Congress it becomes a law of the United States and, similar
to a contract, "must be construed and applied in accordance with its terms") (citing West
Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28 (1951)).
146. 515 U.S. 189, 194 (1995) ("Far from indicating a legislative determination that
prejudgment interest should not be awarded, however, the absence of a statute merely
indicates that the question is governed by traditional judge-made principles.").
147. Id. at 195 n.7 (quoting Bd. of Comm'rs of Jackson Cnty. v. United States, 308
U.S. 343, 352 (1939)).
148. Settlement Act § 209(i) (providing that any order for recoupment of unlawfully
diverted Truckee River water must be consistent with the ESA).
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goals of the ESA."' -Further, in PolarBear ProductionsInc. v. Timex
Coip. the Ninth Circuit declared that the availability of prejudginent interest "hinges on whether such an award would further the statute's purpose."" In other words, interest can be awarded based on a determination of congressional intent even if interest is not expressly provided for
in the statute. Moreover, the Court in Rodgers v. United States held that
"in the absence of an unequivocal prohibition of interest" on statutory
obligations, it could grant interest based on an appraisal of Congress'
purpose in establishing such obligations."' Therefore, the Nevada district
court is likely authorized to award water interest because such relief
complements the statutory water recoupment scheme and furthers the
remedial purposes of the Settlement Act by directly addressing injury to
the Pyramid Lake fishery.
C. THE DUTY TO FULLY COMPENSATE THE TRIBE AND DELIVER
RELIEF PURSUANT TO THE SETTLEMENT ACT FULFILL THE
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO AN AWARD OF WATER INTEREST, AS
EXPRESSED BY THE SUPREME COURT.

The Supreme Court expressly acknowledged the viability of an award
of water interest on the outstanding balance of water due, in its exercise
of original jurisdiction in the interstate compact context. Although the
interstate compact model is not a perfect analogue to federal law expressed in a congressional act, compact cases highlight the Court's view
of whether a particular remedy is sufficient to compensate for injury due
to diversions in excess of federal law. Although the Court usually analyzes unlawful diversions under a compact in terms of breach of contract,
rather than as a violation of federal law (the compact being ratified by
Congress), the process by which the court assigns water recoupment is
similar in both contexts."' In interstate compact adjudication, water re149. Id. § 202(e), (f); see id. S 209(j)(1) (directing the Secretary to implement the
Settlement Act "in a manner that is fully consistent with the decision in the case of
[ Tribe v. Morton]" which ordered that all water not obligated by decree or contract flows
to Pyramid Lake); see also Tribe Opening Brief supra note 130, at 20.
150. 384 F.3d 700, 718 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding "even in absence of legislative
direction, a court may, in its discretion, award interest if necessary to effectuate legislative intent").
151. 332 U.S. 371, 373 (1947).
152. Though ambiguity exists as to whether water recoupment in the interstate compact context is best viewed through a breach of contract, violation of federal law, or
order of mandamus lens, water interest simply addresses the common root injury caused
by diversions in excess of federal law. For example, the Supreme Court in Texas v. New
Mexico II characterized the interstate compact as a contract, ratified by Congress. 482
U.S. 124, 128 (1986) ("IBlut a compact is, after all, a contract.") (citing Petty v. Tenn.Mo. Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 285 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). One
scholar hypothesized that the compact's nature as a positive enactment of law, like the
Settlement Agreement, explains any contract versus statutory enactment ambiguity.
Joseph W. Girardot, Toward a RationalScheme of Interstate Water Compact Adjudication, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 151 nn.57, 58 (1989) (explaining that although the court
hesitates to invoke equity, specific performance is itself an equitable remedy). Rather
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coupment functions as a restitutionary remedy in the equitable apportionment of water. Though the Court's discussion of water interest in
Kansas v. ColoradoI" is less instructive than its decision in Texas v.
New Mexico III,' both decisions acknowledge the viability of water interest in the water recoupment context.
1. Pursuant to Texas v. New Mexico III,it is Necessary to Award Water
Interest to Head Off Procrastination on the Part of TCID in its Repayment of Water to the Tribe.
In Texas v. New Mexico III, the Supreme Court determined that
New Mexico failed to honor the terms of the Pecos River Compact"' such
that Texas was deprived of 340,100 acre-feet of water from 1950 to
1983." Although questions regarding New Mexico's actual, quantifiable
obligations were not resolved until 1984, the Court held that "good-faith
differences about the scope of contractual undertakings do not relieve
either party from performance .

.

..

New Mexico cannot escape liability

for what has been adjudicated to be past failures to perform its duties
under the Compact."'" The Court agreed with Special Master Myers's
recommendation that New Mexico "repay" Texas approximately 34,010
acre-feet of water each year for ten years" since the compact contemplated delivery of water and the court should not order relief inconsistent
with its terms."' Also, in footnote eight the court acknowledged the viability of water interest in instances when nonmonetary relief is granted.'"

than embrace any ambiguity, the Supreme Court in Kansas v. Colorado simply characterized the diversions in excess of compact terms as a breach of contract. Kansas v.
Colorado (Kansas v. Colorado I), 533 U.S. 1, 20 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("We are dealing with an interstate compact apportioning the flow of a river between two
States. A compact is a contract. It represents a bargained-for exchange between its
signatories . . . ."). Finally, the character of "payment in water" might more closely re-

semble an order of mandamus, than specific performance of a contract. Girardot, supra
note 152, at nn.57, 58.
153. 533 U.S. at 9.
154. 482 U.S. at 124 .
155. Pecos River Compact, H.R. 3334, 81st Cong. S Art. 111(a) (1949).
156. 482 U.S. at 127-28.
157. Id. at 129.
158. Id. at 127-28. Responding to New Mexico's argument that it simply did not have
recoupment water available, the Special Master stated that New Mexico state law authorized the state to purchase or condemn water rights and then pump that amount directly
into the Pecos River. Report of the Special Master, supra note 18, at 34-35. The Special Master explained, "only by invoking the power of eminent domain can the state
distribute its own waters as its public policy requires." Id. at 35, n.15 (citing Kaiser Steel
Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 467 P.2d 986, 990 (N.M. 1970)). Because New Mexico law
authorized transfers of water right ownership and permitted changes to the original purpose for appropriation, New Mexico was precluded from arguing that the doctrine of
prior appropriation prevents it from providing the decreed amount to Texas. Report of
the Special Master, supra note 18, at 35.
159.
Texas v. New Mexico III, 482 U.S. at 130 (endorsing Special Master Meyers's
"cautious" approach, the court concluded that although the compact does not mandate
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Yet, even prior to footnote eight, the Court acknowledged its authority to craft a remedy along the lines of the Special Master's recommendation of water interest. Responding to Texas's concern that awarding only
money damages would allow New Mexico to ignore its water debt, the
court announced that its authority to order that water be repaid in-kind,
along with " whatever additionalsanction might be thought necessary for
deliberate failure to perform," would provide sufficient deterrence.""
Thus, the court embraced the Special Master's conclusion: "the relief to
be recommended, at least by a Special Master, ought to be specified in
In light of TCID's dogged opposition to federal
quantities of water."'
regulation, such in-kind relief addresses the potential for TCID to default
on its water repayment obligation.
At its heart, the concept of "water interest" is simply a pragmatic
method to dissuade TCID from procrastinating in the repayment of its
water debt to the Tribe. In Texas v. New Mexico III, Special Master
Meyers expressly designed postjudgment water interest to "prevent procrastination" on the part of New Mexico: "water interest should be
charged on the undelivered balance of water due in any year in which
New Mexico does not meet its annual minimum delivery obligation ('deficit amount')."'" Without an "interest penalty," the Special Master concluded that New Mexico would have no incentive to fulfill its decree
aside from avoidance of further litigation." In essence, water interest
would curb any potential "bad faith" on the part of New Mexico." By
applying the rate (i.e., the yield on the one-year Treasury bills on the date
the deficit was determined) in that case, the Special Master intended to
"approximate the opportunity cost to Texas of late delivery of water by
New Mexico."" Given that it will take time-precipitation and overeager
appropriators permitting-to repay the water debt owed to the Tribe,
postjudgment water interest is necessary to fully compensate for injury
due to diversions in excess of federal law.
2. The Supreme Court's Decision in Kansas v. ColoradoIAlso
Acknowledges the Viability of Water Interest.
Unlike in Texas v. New Mexico III, the Supreme Court in Kansas v.
Colorado I concluded that damages due to Colorado's violation of the
repayment in water in the event of a breach, "[W]e are quite sure that the Compact itself
does not prevent our ordering a suitable remedy, whether in water or money").
160. Id. at 132.
161. Id. (emphasis added).
162. Report of the Special Master, supra note 18, at 32.
163. Id.
164. Id.at38.
165. Id. at 36-37.
166. Id. at 32 n.13 (emphasis added). Moreover, Special Master Meyers was aware of
an inflationary effect.on the water damages award that would work to Texas's detriment,
and thus restricted New Mexico's repayment schedule to no more than ten years. Id. at
41-42.
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interstate compact should be paid in money, not water, considering that
the unlawful diversion period spanned fifty years and any interest rate
would unreasonably compound the total award." The Court cited the
difficulty in implementing a water repayment program-including water
interest-over fifteen years, in light of uncertainty related to the availability of Colorado water in dry years and whether Kansas farmers could
make use of repaid water in wet years." Interestingly, over sixty-six percent of the total amount Kansas claimed in damages was attributable to
prejudgment interest-that amount necessary to compensate for investment opportunities lost due to the unavailability of water." Also, the
Court alluded to something akin to water interest when it concluded that
it was authorized to award interest or "its equivalent" as an element of
damages." The court also described the importance of awarding prejudgment interest to compensate for the fact that during such protracted
litigation, the upstream state retains access to the water and will continue
to divert to the detriment of the downstream state, especially since a preliminary injunction is not available."'
As noted in Part IV(A)(2), this same unfortunate dynamic-by which
claimant's injury is compounded by successive delay in compensation-is
also experienced by the Tribe. A federal court, sitting in equity, likely
has discretion to address this dynamic considering that the water recoupment remedy itself is grounded in equity.. In Kansas v. ColoradoI,
the Supreme Court spoke directly to such equitable principles: "making
up past shortages by delivering more water has 'all the earmarks of specific performance, an equitable remedy that requires some attention to the
relative benefits and burdens that the parties may enjoy or suffer.'""'2
Moreover, the Court analogized water repayment to a money debt and
noted, "[ilf this were a money debt, the full amount would be due upon
167.

Kansas v. Colorado L No. 105, Orig., 2000 WL 34508307, at *50 (Aug. 31,

2000).
168. Id. at *48-50.
169.
Kansas v. Colorado II, 533 U.S. 1, 9, n.2 (2001) (noting that although final damages were not yet calculated, Kansas had claimed $62,369,173 in total damages). Of
note, the court also affirmed the concept that a remedy for excess diversions need only
address the flow available, rather than the source of water. Kansas v. Colorado I, 2000
WL 34508307, at *22 (explaining that the determining factor for compensation is the
flow measured at the state line, not the source of the water).
Kansas v. Colorado II,533 U.S. at 14 (citing Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243,
170.
258 (1924), "When necessary in order to arrive at fair compensation, the court in the
exercise of a sound discretion may include interest or its equivalent as an element of
damages on unliquidated claims.") (emphasis added, internal quotations removed).
Regarding whether Colorado was on notice that it would be subject to automatic prejudgment interest, the court opined that before 1949 it was reasonable to expect a court
to balance the equities when evaluating an award of prejudgment interest. Id. ("Given
the state of the law at that time, Colorado may well have believed that we would balance
the equities in order to achieve a just and equitable remedy, rather than automatically
imposing pre-judgment interest in order to achieve full compensation.").
Kansas v. Colorado I,2000 WL 34508307 at *43.
171.
172.
Id. at *50 (quoting Texas v. New Mexico II,482 U.S. 124, 128 (1986)) (emphasis
added).
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judgment and would bear interest if not paid" and "[aIllowing another
fifteen years to settle the account in water, by paying simply the amount
of the judgment, does not make Kansas whole." Therefore, considering
that the Settlement Agreement specifically requires repayment in water,
and the Supreme Court recognizes that a concomitant award of interest
on such obligation is necessary to make the claimant whole, the Nevada
district court should award water interest on TCID's outstanding debt.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the United States District Court for the District of Nevada's
practical remedy is justified on several grounds, including: 1) common
law principles controlling an award of pre and postjudgment interest on
damages; 2) the recoupment scheme as codified in the Settlement Act;
and 3) United States Supreme Court precedent in the water recoupment
context. Moreover, water interest directly redresses injuries sustained by
the Pyramid Lake fishery-a fishery upon which the Tribe depends for its
livelihood.' Given TCID's recalcitrance, the Ninth Circuit's approval of
this novel remedy might usher in a more pragmatic compensation scheme
to address time-sensitive interests in similar long-standing water rights
contests in other basins.'"

173. Kansas v. ColoradoI 2000 WL 34508307 at *50 (emphasis added).
174. Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 254 (D.D.C. 1973) ("[Pyramidl Lake has
been the Tribe's principal source of livelihood. Members of the Tribe have always lived
* The area has been consistently
on its shores and have fished its waters for food.
recognized as the Tribe's aboriginal home.").
175. Id. at 257-58 (chronicling TCID's declaration "that it will disregard the new
regulation and will divert water as it chooses by giving instructions to its own water mas-

ters"); see also TCID v. Secretary, 742 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1984) (describing how in
1973, the first year in which the Secretary's new regulations were in effect, "TCID intentionally violated [the OCAPs] by diverting more water than the regulations permitted").

